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Highlights 
 
 Eye movements (EMs) are applied to involuntary and intrusive social anxiety 
imagery 
 Images were lower in vividness after EMs than after a control task 
 EMs may prevent increases in intrusive image vividness following exposure 
 
Abstract 
 
Background and objectives: A growing body of research has shown that negative, 
intrusive mental imagery plays a prevalent and causal role in social anxiety, and is 
qualitatively different to voluntarily generated imagery. Negative imagery can be 
reduced in vividness and emotional intensity through concurrent lateral eye 
movements (EMs) as per Eye Movement Desensitisation and Reprocessing (EMDR) 
therapy. Despite EMDR being used for a range of disorders, previous laboratory-
based experimental research typically uses voluntarily generated autobiographical 
memories rather than involuntarily experienced intrusive images. In a pilot study, we 
investigated the efficacy of eye movement attenuation of negative, intrusive, social-
anxiety imagery. 
Methods: Twenty-seven participants (aged 18-29, 20 females) screened for social 
anxiety using the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale and who experienced intrusive 
imagery visualised their image while making eye movements or completing a control 
task. Self-report ratings of image vividness and emotionality were taken at baseline, 
immediately after the tasks, and following a post-test visualisation of their image.  
Results: Vividness reduced from baseline during the eye movements task, but not 
the control task, and vividness was lower at post-test in the EMs condition than in the 
control condition. This effect was not observed for emotionality. 
Limitations: As a pilot study, the sample size was small and so replication on a 
larger scale is warranted. 
Conclusions: EMs may prevent increases in vividness as a result of exposure to 
intrusive imagery. These findings tentatively suggest a promising extension of the 
topical eye movements paradigm to intrusive social anxiety images, and potential 
justification for EMDR intervention outside of PTSD.  
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1. Introduction 
Recurrent and intrusive mental imagery based on negative autobiographical memory 
is a cardinal feature of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD; Hackmann, Ehlers, 
Speckens & Clark, 2004; Holmes, Grey & Young, 2004), but interest in its role as a 
transdiagnostic phenomenon is increasing (Brewin, Gregory, Lipton & Burgess, 
2010; Clark, James, Iyadurai & Holmes, 2015; Hackmann & Holmes, 2004). In 
primarily adult, Western, and clinical/sub-clinical samples, qualitative investigations 
have shown its prevalence in depression, anxiety disorders, and psychosis, amongst 
other diagnoses (see Brewin et al., 2010 for a review).  Accordingly, imagery focused 
interventions are receiving a growing amount of research attention. Eye Movement 
Desensitisation and Reprocessing Therapy (EMDR) is an evidence-based and NICE 
recommended therapy for PTSD (Bisson et al., 2007; Cloitre, 2009; Lee & Cuijpers, 
2013; NICE, 2005). Perhaps the most unique and controversial component of EMDR 
is its use of horizontal eye movements (EMs), during which clients visualise their 
trauma image with the aim of reducing its potency. Assessment of the efficacy of 
EMs in this regard, and attempts to determine their specific underlying mechanisms, 
have attracted a large body of basic science research. Typically, tasks requiring 
horizontal saccades are employed during the visualisation of negative 
autobiographical memories with pre-test and post-test ratings of self-reported image 
vividness and emotional intensity (emotionality) (see Jeffries & Davis, 2013 and van 
den Hout & Engelhard, 2012, for reviews). Investigated in this way, EMs have been 
shown most consistently to reduce the vividness, but at times also the  emotionality 
of negative memories (e.g. Andrade, Kavanagh and Baddeley, 1997; Barrowcliff, 
Gray, Freeman & MacCulloch, 2004; Kavanagh, Freese, Andrade & May, 2001; 
Lilley, Andrade, Turpin, Sabin-Farrell and Holmes, 2009; van den Hout, Muris, 
Salemink & Kindt, 2001) negative prospective imagery (Engelhard, van den Hout, 
Janssen & van der Beek, 2010; Engelhard, van den Hout et al., 2011; Engelhard, 
Sijbr, van den Hout & Rutherford, 2011), food craving imagery (Kemps, Tiggemann, 
Woods & Soekov, 2004; McClelland, Kemps & Tiggemann, 2006) and public 
speaking imagery (Homer, Deeprose & Andrade, 2016; Kearns & Engelhard, 2015). 
The general consensus is that EMs during image visualisation compete for limited 
working memory (WM) resources thus reducing image vividness (van den Hout & 
Engelhard, 2012; Stewart, Homer, Deeprose & Andrade, in prep.). In their degraded 
form, images consume fewer WM resources when visualised, allowing more 
resources to be allocated to the therapeutic elements of EMDR. However, some 
debate remains as to whether this interference should be modality-specific, i.e. 
visuospatial interference such as EMs preferentially attenuates visual imagery 
(Andrade, Kavanagh & Baddeley, 1997), or general, i.e. any WM interference task 
attenuates imagery of any modality (Gunter & Bodner, 2008).   
 
Intrusive mental imagery features in cognitive models of social anxiety (e.g. Clark & 
Wells, 1995; Hofmann, 2007) and is prevalent in both clinical and sub-clinical 
samples (e.g. Hackmann, Clark & McManus, 2000; Homer & Deeprose, 2017) and 
causes anxiety, negative affect, decreased self-esteem, and poorer social 
performance (Hulme, Hirsch, & Stopa, 2012; Moscovitch et al., 2011; Hirsch, Clark, 
Mathews & Williams, 2003; Hirsch, Meynen & Clark, 2004; see Ng et al., 2014 for a 
review). In line with research showing that voluntary and involuntary memories can 
be independent (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Ehlers and Clark, 2000; Brewin 
and Holmes, 2003), intrusive social anxiety imagery is phenomenologically different 
to voluntarily generated imagery (for example, it may comprise self-representations 
or prospective imagery rather than contextualised episodic memories) and is 
associated with higher levels of anxiety (Homer & Deeprose, 2017). This study 
sought to extend the EMs paradigm to intrusive, involuntary imagery in a sub-clinical 
socially anxious sample, to yield stronger clinical implications than previous research 
using voluntarily-generated images in healthy samples. EMDR for PTSD has a 
strong experimental and clinical evidence base (NICE, 2005), but its efficacy in other 
disorders, including phobias and anxiety disorders, is largely anecdotal (van den 
Hout & Engelhard, 2012, see also Stewart et al., in prep.). This study represents a 
first step towards experimental testing of EMs / WM interference interventions for 
intrusive imagery directly associated with disorders other than PTSD.  
 
In a small pilot study, undergraduate students screened to be high in social anxiety 
and who reported intrusive social imagery were asked to visualise the image they 
experience recurrently and intrusively while performing EMs or a control task in 
which the eyes remained stationary. We hypothesised that: 
1) The EMs task would cause images to reduce in vividness and emotionality 
more so than the control task. 
2) Images in the EMs condition would remain lower in vividness and emotionality 
than those in the control condition during the post-test visualisation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
One hundred and ten Plymouth University undergraduate students signed up to the 
study and took part in screening. Fifty students met screening criteria and thirty-eight 
attended the study for course credit or small payment. Twenty-seven participants 
reported experiencing intrusive mental imagery during a parallel investigation into 
image phenomenology (see Homer & Deeprose, 2017) and are reported here, mean 
age 20 years, SD = 2.51, age range = 18-29, 20 females. Four participants (14.81%) 
disclosed a diagnosis of anxiety, one participant (3.70%) indicated uncertainty and 
two participants (7.41%) declined to respond to this question. 
 
2.2 Measures 
Screening measure: Participants were screened using the Social Interaction 
Anxiety Scale (SIAS) (Mattick & Clark, 1998). Participants endorsed statements such 
as “I have difficulty talking with other people” on a 5-point Likert scale scored 0-4 
(never/almost never; not usually; sometimes; usually; always/almost always), 
providing scores between 0 and 76.  The scale has high internal validity in student 
samples, Cronbach’s α = .88 - .97 (Hulme, Hirsch & Stopa, 2012; Mattick & Clarke, 
1998). Mattick & Clark (1998) report an undergraduate mean of 19, SD = 10.1. 
Students scoring at least one SD above average (≥ 29) participated as per Hulme, 
Hirsch & Stopa (2012). 
 
Baseline Depression, Anxiety and Stress: Baseline depression, anxiety and 
stress was measured by the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale -21 (DASS-21) 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). Participants indicated the degree to which statements 
including, “I felt down-hearted and blue” had applied to them over the past week by 
responding on a 4-point Likert scale scored 0-3 (never/not at all; sometimes; often; 
almost always; most of the time), providing scores between 0 and 63. Henry & 
Crawford (2005) report good internal consistency, α = .93. 
 
Working memory interference: As per Homer et al. (2016), working memory 
interference was generated by computerised tasks based on Andrade et al. (1997) 
and Boomsma (2013).  
Experimental condition: In the visuospatial (EMs) task, letters (bold, 7mm in 
height) were presented repeatedly at alternate sides of the computer screen. A 
background of 1.5cm wide black and white stripes increased visuospatial 
interference. Participants responded to target letters by pressing the space bar. Two 
randomly positioned target letters among 18 distractor letters comprised one 
sequence, two sequences comprised one trial and three trials comprised one block. 
The entire task consisted of three blocks lasting 60 seconds each. Trial 1 of each 
block utilised the target letter q and distractor letter p, trials 2 and 3 used target-
distractor letter pairings d-p and n-m. Letters were presented for 300msec with a 
200msec interstimulus interval. Participants were asked to refrain from moving their 
heads, thus moving only their eyes during the task to ensure visuospatial 
interference. A practice task comprising one target letter among six distractors 
preceded the main task. Participants were instructed to visualise their image 
throughout the task and were reminded at the beginning of each block. Participants 
were scored on number of correct responses (18 maximum). 
Control condition: The control task matched the visuospatial task exactly, 
with the exception that all letters were presented centrally against a white 
background thus not requiring EMs. 
 
2.3 Procedure 
Ethical approval was granted by the University of Plymouth Health and Human 
Sciences Ethics Committee. Participants scoring at least one SD above average on 
the social anxiety screening measure (SIAS) attended a 45 minute laboratory 
session. After briefing and informed consent, participants completed a computerised 
questionnaire in which they described their imagery and completed some questions 
on image phenomenology as part of a parallel qualitative investigation (see Homer & 
Deeprose, 2017). Participants who reported experiencing intrusive social anxiety-
images then visualised their image for 20 seconds (timed by the software). On 10cm 
VASs, they then rated its vividness (‘How vivid was your image during the 
visualisation?’) from 0 (‘Not at all vivid’) to 10 (‘Extremely vivid’) and emotionality 
(‘How emotional did you feel whilst visualising your image?’) from 0 (‘Not at all 
emotional’) to 10 (‘Extremely emotional’). Using a random number generator, 
participants were randomly allocated to either the EMs task or the control task, which 
they completed while holding their image in mind. Directly after, they rated the 
vividness and emotionality of their image during the task. Participants then visualised 
their image again for 20 seconds and rated post-test vividness and emotionality. 
Finally, participants completed a mood reversal task in which they recalled and 
visualised an enjoyable social situation. 
 
3. Results 
Assumptions of parametric tests were checked and no causes for concern were 
identified. One extreme outlier was removed, leaving 14 participants in the EMs 
condition and 12 in the control condition.  
 
3.1 Screening, baseline and control measures 
The mean SIAS score was 40.85, SD = 9.43, range = 29-58. The mean DASS-21 
score was 20.58, SD = 9.60, range = 5-40, and the scale showed good internal 
consistency, α = .89. Independent samples t tests showed no differences between 
groups in SIAS or DASS-21 scores, ps > .304.  
Participants who completed the control task, M = 17.42, SD = .79, range = 16-18, 
were significantly more accurate in their responses than those who completed the 
EMs task, M = 16.71, SD = .83, range = 15-18, t(24) = -2.20, p = .037, d = -0.87.  
 
3.2 Self-rated Image Vividness 
Baseline vividness scores were significantly higher in the EMs condition, t(24) = 
2.50, p = .02, d = 0.98, and so scores were standardised by dividing participants’ 
baseline, during-task, and post-test vividness scores by their baseline vividness 
scores across both conditions. A 3x2 mixed ANOVA revealed significant main effects 
for both time, F(2, 48) = 11.80, p < .001, η2 = .30, and condition, F(1, 24) = 5.82, p = 
.024, η2 = .20 , and a significant interaction, F(2, 48) = 3.35, p = .043, η2 = .09 (see 
fig. 1). Descriptive statistics are shown in table 1.  
 
 
 
Table 1 
Mean raw and standardised scores for vividness and mean scores for emotionality. 
SDs and ranges shown in brackets.  
  
Eye movements 
n = 14 
 
Control 
n = 12 
 
Vividness 
  
 
Raw scores 
Baseline 
 
 
7.36  
(SD = 1.69, range = 4-10) 
 
 
5.33  
(SD = 2.42, range = 2-9) 
During task 3.79 
 (SD = 2.26, range = 0-7) 
3.50  
(SD = 1.98, range = 1-7) 
Post-test visualisation 
 
6.50  
(SD = 1.95, range = 3-10) 
6.42  
(SD = 1.56, range = 4-9) 
Standardised scores   
Baseline 1.00  
(SD = 0, range = 1-1) 
1.00  
(SD = 0, range = 1-1) 
During task .57  
(SD = .36, range = 0-1.17) 
.76  
(SD = .53, range = .11-2) 
Post-test visualisation .90  
(SD = .25, range = .43-1.29) 
1.45  
(SD = .76, range = .83-3.5) 
 
Emotionality 
  
 
Baseline 
 
5.57  
(SD = 1.45, range = 3-8) 
 
5.92  
(SD = 2.02, range = 3-10) 
During task 3.86  
(SD = 2.07, range = 0-7) 
2.75  
(SD = 1.76, range = 0-6) 
Post-test visualisation 4.93  
(SD = 1.94, range = 0-7) 
5.67 
(SD = 1.50, range = 3-8) 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1:  Vividness scores at baseline, during the task and at the post-test 
visualisation for both conditions.  
 
Paired and independent samples t tests showed that while there were no between-
group differences in vividness during the task, t(24) = -1.13, p = .269, vividness had 
reduced significantly from baseline in the EMs condition, t(13) = 4.51, p = .001, d = 
1.21, but not the control condition, t(11) = 1.55, p = .150. Vividness increased from 
during the task to post-test in both conditions, t(13) = -3.77, p = .002, d = -1.01 
(EMs), t(11) = -2.82, p = .017, d = -0.81 (control), but was significantly higher at post-
test in the control condition, t(13.02) = -2.37, p = .034, d = .97 (equal variances not 
assumed). Neither the drop in vividness from baseline to post-test in the EMs 
condition nor the increase in vividness from baseline to post-test in the control 
condition reached significance, t(13) = 1.46, p = .169 (EMs), t(11) = -2.03, p = .067 
(control). 
 
 
 
3.3 Self-rated Image Emotionality  
An independent samples t test showed no differences in baseline emotionality 
scores between groups, t(24) = -.51, p = .618. A 3x2 mixed ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect for time, F(2, 48) = 22.62, p < .001, η2 = .045, but not 
condition, F(2, 48) = .00, p = .989. The time x condition interaction showed a 
statistical trend but did not reach significance, F(2, 48) = 3.16, p = .051, η2 = .064. 
See table 1 for descriptive statistics. 
Paired and independent samples t tests to investigate this trend showed that 
during the tasks, emotionality dropped significantly from baseline in both conditions, 
t(13) = 3.12, p = .008, d = .84 (EMs), t(11) = 4.30, p = .001, d = 1.24 (control), and 
then increased again at post-test, t(13) = -2.38, p = .033, d = -0.64 (EMs), t(11) = -
5.00, p < .001, d = -1.44 (control). There were no between-group differences in 
emotionality at either time-point, t(24) = 1.45, p = .159 (during task), t(24) = -1.07, p 
= .295 (post-test), and neither group’s emotionality decreased from baseline to post-
test, t(13) = 1.26, p = .229 (EMs), t(11) = .609, p = .555 (control).  
 
4. Discussion 
As predicted, and in line with the WM framework, a concurrent EMs task reduced 
image vividness more so than a similar control task not requiring EMs. Vividness in 
the EMs condition returned to baseline levels at post-test while a statistical trend 
indicated an increase in vividness from baseline to post-test in the control condition. 
This finding does not reflect most previous research, in which post-test vividness 
ratings are typically lower than baseline ratings (e.g. Barrowcliff, Gray, Freeman & 
MacCulloch, 2004; Engelhard et al. 2010; Kavanagh et al., 2001; Kemps & 
Tiggemann, 2007; van den Hout, et al., 2001). Interestingly, a similar result was 
observed by Engelhard, van den Hout et al. (2011), who investigated the effects of 
EMs on intrusive prospective imagery. As observed here, the drop in vividness in the 
EMs condition and increase in vividness in the control condition did not reach 
significance, but vividness at post-test was higher in the control condition than in the 
EMs condition. These effects were weaker than those of a similar study using non-
intrusive prospective imagery (Engelhard et al., 2010). Together, these results 
suggest that intrusive imagery may be more resilient to EM attenuation, but EMs 
may prevent increases in vividness caused by exposure. That intrusive images 
should behave differently under WM interference to voluntarily generated images is 
unsurprising given the intrinsic differences between voluntary and involuntary 
memories (Brewin & Holmes, 2003; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Ehlers & 
Clarke, 2000; Homer & Deeprose, 2017), but this hypothesis requires further 
investigation. While this distinction could be considered by practitioners, its impact 
on therapy is not yet clear.  
 
Effects for emotionality did not mirror those for vividness. Emotionality dropped 
during the concurrent tasks in both conditions, with no differences between groups 
and no reductions from baseline to post-test. This is in keeping with several studies 
showing that effects for emotionality are not as reliable as those for vividness (e.g. 
Andrade et al., 1997, experiments 1 – 3; Homer et al., 2016; Leer, Engelhard & van 
den Hout, 2014). Future research should use more sensitive emotionality measures, 
such as implicit and explicit self-esteem and state anxiety, or objective measures 
such as galvanic skin response. Given the high comorbidity between social anxiety 
and depression, future emotionality measures should seek to differentiate between 
the two constructs.  
The main finding, that vividness was lower after the EMs task than after the control 
task, has several implications. EMDR is applied to a range of disorders, but its 
evidence base beyond PTSD is largely anecdotal (van den Hout & Engelhard, 2012). 
This study represents a tentative first step in basic science justification for EMDR in 
social anxiety, in that EMs may prevent increases in image vividness and therefore 
consumption of WM resources during exposure, thus allowing more resources to be 
allocated to other therapeutic procedures (see Shapiro, 1995; Shapiro and Forrest, 
2001 and Stewart et al., in prep.). However, conclusions drawn from this study reflect 
intrusive images only – effects of WM interference on voluntarily generated, 
negative, episodic memories in social anxiety (e.g. for those who do not experience 
intrusive imagery) are not yet known.  
 
The study has several limitations. As a small pilot study, statistical power may have 
been lacking and so implications are tentative. Our results are specific to a sub-
clinical student sample: while low-level interventions for sub-clinical distress are a 
worthy pursuit (Homer & Deeprose, 2017), implications for clinical samples are 
limited. Including a clinically-diagnosed socially anxious group would strengthen 
applied implications. We cannot conclude that beneficial effects of the EMs task 
were due to increased visuospatial WM interference specifically (e.g. Andrade et al., 
1997), as the differences in task accuracy suggest that the EMs task may have 
required more general cognitive resources than the control task (e.g. Gunter & 
Bodner, 2008; see Stewart et al., in prep. for detailed discussion). Most participants 
were white British, but ethnicity was not formally recorded. 
 
Further experimental research should replicate the study in analogues of other 
disorders in which intrusive imagery is problematic. Post-test measures could include 
social anxiety as well as image vividness and emotionality, and longitudinal 
investigations would provide more insight into clinical utility.  
 
4.1 Conclusions 
EMs may prevent increases in the vividness of intrusive social anxiety images 
caused by exposure. However, in line with several previous studies, EMs did not 
appear to have any benefits for image emotionality, suggesting that the relationship 
between the vividness and emotionality of mental imagery should be investigated 
more thoroughly. This finding provides a preliminary rationale for EMDR intervention 
for disorders beyond PTSD, in that the prevention of an increase in vividness during 
exposure to problematic mental imagery would allow more WM resources to be 
allocated to other therapeutic elements of EMDR. 
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